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NINO’S NIGHTMARE: LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AS A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF TOGGLING BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 1957–58 was the annus mirabilis of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. In 1957, H.L.A. Hart, the Regius Professor of Jurisprudence at 
Oxford, delivered the Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law School, which were 
published in the law review in February 1958 and, later, as The Concept of 
Law (1961), still the leading articulation of the philosophy of legal positivism.1 
Also in 1958, Professors Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks finalized the 
“tentative draft” of their materials on The Legal Process; these materials, now 
available in print, set forth a purpose-based version of legal positivism.2 In a 
law review exchange with H.L.A. Hart, also published in February 1958,3 and 
then in The Morality of Law (1964), Professor Lon Fuller pressed the purpose 
theory of law away from positivism and toward a theory of law that integrated 
it with morality.4 
 
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. This Article was delivered as the 
keynote address for the Childress Lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law on October 12, 
2012. I appreciate comments from Jim Brudney, Victoria Nourse, Karen Petroski, Ted Ruger, 
Scott Shapiro, and Doug Williams. 
 1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958) [hereinafter Hart, Law and Morals]; see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994) 
[hereinafter HART, CONCEPT OF LAW]. See generally H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY (1983) (collection of positivist and other jurisprudence essays by Professor 
Hart). 
 2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW iii–vi (tent. ed. 1958) (subsequently edited and 
published by William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 1994) (subsequent citations will be to 
the published edition). 
 3. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and the Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, A Reply]. 
 4. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (subsequent book elaborating on the 
procedure-based natural law theory that appeared in Fuller’s Harvard Law Review article) (2d ed. 
1964) (subsequent citations will be to the second edition). 
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A commonly overlooked feature of these classics is their strong focus on 
statutory interpretation as the primary locus for jurisprudential theory.5 The 
published versions of Hart’s Holmes Lectures used as their main example a 
hypothetical ordinance barring “vehicles” from municipal parks.6 Hart and 
Sacks’ The Legal Process opened with two statutory problems, namely, “The 
Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes”7 and “The Case of the Spoiled Heir.”8 The 
centerpiece of their materials was the lengthy chapter on statutory 
interpretation.9 Fuller’s reply to Hart focused on the proper application of the 
“no vehicles in the park” and of German statutes used to prosecute Nazi 
sympathizers after World War II.10 
A universally overlooked feature of this remarkable year is that it was also 
the intellectual and professional birthing time for today’s leading exponents of 
these competing jurisprudential theories. That is, in 1957, just after the Holmes 
Lectures had been delivered, Ronald Dworkin graduated from the Harvard 
Law School. At the end of the summer, Antonin Scalia entered it and was a 
student when H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller engaged in their jurisprudential 
debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review (which Scalia joined as an 
editor in the summer of 1958), and when his teachers Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks completed the tentative edition of their legal process materials. Stephen 
Breyer matriculated at the law school in 1961, the year H.L.A. Hart published 
The Concept of Law (the book version of the Holmes Lectures), and graduated 
in 1964, the year Lon Fuller published The Morality of Law (his book-length 
response to Hart). Today, Nino Scalia is the most notable public official who 
embraces the (Hartian) legal positivist approach to law; Steve Breyer is the 
most prominent exponent of the legal process approach; and Ronnie Dworkin 
is the great theorist of what is often called a natural law approach to law but 
what I shall term a normativist approach. Each has written classic accounts, 
aimed at relatively large audiences, defending their different jurisprudential 
 
 5. This feature would not have been overlooked by the authors themselves. H.L.A. Hart 
was a visiting professor at Harvard Law in 1956–57 and participated with Henry Hart, Al Sacks, 
Lon Fuller, Herbert Wechsler, and Julius Stone (the latter two also visiting professors) in a legal 
philosophy seminar that focused on discretion in statutory cases in that academic year. William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal 
Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at c–cii (describing the seminar’s attendees and some of 
the papers presented). 
 6. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 123–29; Hart, Law and Morals, supra note 1, 
at 607–11. 
 7. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 10–68. 
 8. Id. at 68–102. 
 9. Id. at 1111–1382 (“Chapter 7. The Role of the Courts in the Interpretation of Statutes”). 
 10. Fuller, A Reply, supra note 3, at 661–69. 
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commitments, and each book has brought jurisprudence to bear on the proper 
method for judges to follow when interpreting statutes.11 
This year (2012–13) is the fifty-fifth anniversary of this annus mirabilis in 
American legisprudence. I want to use the occasion of the Childress Lecture to 
illustrate the different perspectives developed by these four scholars (Oxford’s 
Hart and Harvard’s Hart, Sacks, and Fuller) and deepened by their intellectual 
successors—the Supreme Court’s Scalia and Breyer and Yale’s, Oxford’s, and 
New York University’s Dworkin. 
The thesis of this Lecture, however, is that American judging in the 
famous “hard cases” suggests that these different jurisprudential approaches to 
statutes (what Julius Cohen calls “legisprudence”12) interact in interesting and 
productive ways. The public face of judging in this country is positivism, 
where law’s authority is not contingent upon any connection to morals and is 
determined, instead, by reference to social facts.13 Judging, by this account, is 
driven by a methodology dictated by social convention: what traditionally has 
been the practice of judges interpreting the law? Interestingly, positivists do 
not agree about which statutory interpretation methodology actually does 
reflect established practice and social convention, but positivist legisprudence 
does claim to follow a method(s) that reflects and entrenches the predictability 
and objectivity of the rule of law.14 
Ironically, even jurists, such as Justice Scalia, who see themselves as 
thoroughgoing positivists, ultimately justify their theories of statutory 
interpretation by reference to normative rather than descriptive sources. Thus, 
Scalia believes that his textualist legisprudence is justified by reference to 
social practice as well as the original meaning of Article III’s grant of “judicial 
 
 11. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005) (advancing a legal process purpose-of-the-
statute theory and discussing an array of statutory cases that divided the Supreme Court in recent 
years); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–29 (1986) (advancing a normativist theory of law 
as integrity and focusing on two statutory cases, one involving the spoiled heir introduced to legal 
education by Hart and Sacks, and the other involving the halting of a multi-million dollar dam 
because of statutory protection for the endangered snail darter); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 18–23 (1997) (advancing a positivist theory and focusing on only one case, 
where he argues that the Supreme Court misinterpreted an 1892 immigration statute when it 
exempted a Christian minister from its plain language). Each of these authors has published more 
recent books consistent with the themes developed in these earlier classics. See STEPHEN 
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010) [hereinafter BREYER, 
DEMOCRACY]; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1996); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); see also Ronald Dworkin, Response, in EXPLORING 
LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 291 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). 
 12. Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950). 
 13. JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 37, 
45–46 (1979). 
 14. See sources discussed infra note 30. 
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Power” to the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts, but he has never 
adduced evidence supporting that belief, and the evidence strongly runs in 
other directions.15 In his most recent book, he deemphasizes the positivist 
criterion for proper methodology and makes his case in an openly normative 
fashion: textualism, he maintains, is the only methodology that yields 
predictability in the application of statutes to new factual circumstances.16 
Consistent with his deployment of both positivist and normative jurisprudence 
to justify his textualist methodology, Justice Scalia applies his methodology by 
moving back and forth between positivist description and normativist 
prescription.17 
I call this phenomenon “jurisprudential toggling.”18 That self-professed 
positivists toggle between descriptive and prescriptive reasons both when they 
justify their theories of statutory interpretation and when they apply those 
theories, is a huge problem for positivist legisprudence such as that espoused 
by Justice Scalia because positivists claim that law operates only by reference 
to social facts and conventions and is not characterized by normative 
evaluation.19 The phenomenon of toggling reveals law to be more complicated 
than they claim. 
But jurisprudential toggling of this sort also provides an account of self-
professed normativist legisprudences, most notably that of Professor Dworkin. 
Dworkin maintains that the grounds of law are normative: What is the best 
justification for the rules that we have created?20 Given those grounds of law, 
Dworkin maintains that the appropriate theory of statutory interpretation ought 
 
 15. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 998, 1083–87 (2001) 
(demonstrating that the original meaning of “judicial Power,” at the time of the framing, was not 
strictly textual and was more consistent with pragmatic and purposive methods); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 678–81 (1990) (demonstrating that the 
constitutional structure is inconsistent with Scalia’s new textualist approach). 
 16. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at xxviii-xxix; see also id. at 377–78 (summing up 
the case against legislative history—in purely normative terms—as freeing judges of “legal” 
constraints and turning them loose to impose their own values upon statutes). 
 17. See Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011) 
(demonstrating that Justice Scalia’s commitment to objective rules alternates with his equally 
heartfelt insistence that judges avoid absurd or even unreasonable interpretations). 
 18. As I understand it, toggling on a computer is alternating back and forth between two 
functions (e.g., italics and normal font) by pressing one or more keys. Jurisprudential toggling, as 
I am using the term, is alternating back and forth between two jurisprudential forms, i.e., the 
positivist focus on social facts and conventions and the normativist focus on norms and political 
morality. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: 
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 769 (1991) (discussing the 
related notion that facts and norms are interconnected). 
 19. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 134–35. 
 20. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 310–12. 
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to be what he calls “law as integrity”: Which interpretation helps the statute 
become the best regulatory regime that it can be, under the circumstances of 
our culture and its history?21 Notice that Dworkin’s meta-theory and his 
methodological theory are openly normative but also in practice dependent on 
facts and conventions. 
That both positivist and normativist legisprudences toggle between 
facts/description and norms/prescription might dissolve the theoretical divide 
between the primary schools of legisprudence. This is, perhaps, a point of 
limited interest. Of broader interest is the idea that judging always involves a 
dialectic between finding/description and inventing/prescription. In the space 
of this Article, I cannot prove that hard statutory cases inevitably involve such 
a jurisprudential dialectic, but I can demonstrate the interesting operation of 
this idea in the famous Case of the Spotted Owl, Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.22 
The issue in the case was this: Did the Department of Interior have 
authority under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to prohibit landowners 
from harming the spotted owl and other endangered species by destroying their 
essential habitat in the process of farming, timber-cutting, and developing their 
properties? Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court and Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion both toggled between a positivist reliance on conventional 
canons for deciding statutory cases and a normativist reliance on political 
morality. Although Justice Scalia is, both generally and in this particular case, 
most insistent that statutory interpretation needs to be purely a matter of 
applying preexisting facts and conventions, the normative features are 
especially salient in his opinion. That is why I have entitled this paper as 
“Nino’s Nightmare.” 
So Hartian positivists such as Justice Scalia are unable to purge larger 
normative commitments from their deployment of conventional sources of 
statutory meaning. Normativists such as Professor Dworkin celebrate political 
morality in statutory cases but need to bind their theory to the actual rather 
than idealized political history of our society. I shall further argue, in Part III, 
that the legal process school, founded by Professors Hart and Sacks and 
currently featuring Justice Breyer, consciously embraces the fact-norm toggle 
as the core of its legisprudence and its theory of statutory interpretation. Legal 
process thinkers ground their meta-level analysis in the proposition that law 
serves social purposes that are both instrumental (e.g., solving collective action 
problems and creating economic and social structures for the population) and 
normative (e.g., creating conditions for social cooperation and ensuring 
fairness). 
 
 21. Id. at 338–39. 
 22. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, with Justice Scalia vigorously 
dissenting. 
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In parallel fashion, but less explicitly, the Hart and Sacks theory of 
statutory interpretation toggles between facts and norms. By their account, the 
judge should choose the interpretation that best carries out the statutory 
purpose, unless it imposes upon the words a meaning they will not bear or 
contravenes our polity’s larger normative commitments.23 Their purposive 
theory, as applied in cases like Sweet Home, toggles between factual inquiries 
and evaluative inquiries. Factual: What was the legislative purpose? Can the 
words of the statute “bear” the best-fits-purpose option? Normative: In 
assigning purpose, the judge must assume “reasonable” legislators. Does the 
best-fits-purpose option contravene the polity’s larger normative 
commitments? How do different rules create different purposive regimes or 
transform old regimes? 
As illustrated in his dissent in the Case of the Spotted Owl, Justice Scalia, 
the out-of-the-closet positivist who laces his opinions with normative thinking, 
is also at heart a legal process jurist. Ultimately, I do not consider legal process 
theory to be an escape from Nino’s Nightmare (or Ronnie’s Nightmare either), 
for I shall maintain that legal process theory is distinctive because it embraces 
the jurisprudence of toggling. The exemplar of legisprudential toggling is 
Justice Breyer, who joined the majority opinion in Sweet Home. 
As the Spotted Owl Case also illustrates, legal process theory also rests 
importantly upon institutional toggling, between courts and agencies. This is 
perhaps its most important contribution to legisprudence, namely, the idea that 
agencies and not courts are the engines for statutory interpretation in the 
modern regulatory state, with agencies enjoying primacy over the instrumental 
features of statutory application, and courts serving as a normative check on 
agencies when they contravene our polity’s larger democratic and substantive 
commitments. 
I.  POSITIVIST LEGISPRUDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF CLOSETED NORMS 
Although few American judges and lawyers are learned in jurisprudence, 
most of them have a general understanding of legal positivism, especially this 
well-known precept: “The fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, or 
prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the 
fact that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason 
for doubting it.”24 This is a widely accepted norm in our legal culture, yet I 
shall now argue that the positivist judge in the hard cases finds it natural to 
invest statutory meaning with her or his interpretation of the moral or 
 
 23. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374. 
 24. Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2009), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism. 
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normative context of the statute, and then to justify such judgments based upon 
conventional sources. 
Professor H.L.A. Hart’s theory of legal positivism starts with the 
proposition that every legal system has a “rule of recognition”—a convention 
that determines which rules are, and which rules are not, part of the legal 
system.25 In developed legal systems, the rule of recognition typically operates 
by identifying “some general characteristic” that other rules must possess to be 
legally valid, such as “the fact of their having been enacted by a specific body, 
or their long customary practice, or their relation to judicial decisions.”26 
Where there is more than one such characteristic, the rule makes “provision . . . 
for their possible conflict by their arrangement in an order of superiority, as by 
the common subordination of custom or precedent to statute, the latter being a 
‘superior source’ of law.”27 
According to positivists, the content of the rule of recognition is a matter 
of social convention. Thus, “[t]o state for a particular society what the criteria 
of law are, and the hierarchy in which these criteria stand to each other, is to 
describe the standards that recognized officials [in the society] . . . accept.”28 
Acknowledging that the rule of recognition alone would not settle every legal 
dispute, Hart saw a central role for judges who would make “authoritative 
determinations” regarding the “particular acts, things, and circumstances” that 
qualify “as instances of the general classifications which the law makes.”29 
The goal of the judge is to discover the existing meaning of the law, based 
on traditional, socially accepted legal materials such as text, structure, history, 
precedent, and so forth. Although they start with the same meta-theory, 
different positivist theorists derive from practice and convention a range of 
different methodologies for statutory interpretation.30 For example, Justices 
 
 25. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 91, 92–93 (a legal system consists of “a union 
for primary rules of obligation,” together with “secondary rules” such as the rule of recognition); 
see Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Rule of Recognition (and Does It Exist)?, in THE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 235, 237–38 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar 
Himma eds., 2009) (the rule of recognition is a “rule about rules”). 
 26. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 92. 
 27. Id. at 92–93. 
 28. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 
624 (1987); see HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 113 (arguing that for a legal system to 
exist, “its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity . . . must be effectively 
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.”); RAZ, supra note 13, 
at 37 (articulating a similarly positivist legal order, where law rests upon factual judgments and 
not moral ones); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 27–30 (2011) (describing positivist evaluation of 
the legitimacy of legal interpretation as resting entirely upon a sociological inquiry into whether 
the interpretation follows accepted practice). 
 29. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 121. 
 30. Thus, Joseph Raz and Andrei Marmor derive from positivist premises the norm that the 
judge should implement “legislative intent.” See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
872 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:865 
Scalia and Stevens both present themselves as positivists, as each justifies his 
approach to statutory interpretation by reference to precedent and accepted 
conventions31—but they interpret precedent and convention to support 
different methodologies. For Scalia, convention requires that judges apply 
textual plain meanings without regard to legislative expectation; for Stevens, 
convention requires that judges seek out and apply legislative intent.32 
Most judges, lawyers, and law professors agree with H.L.A. Hart’s view 
that “the life of the law” consists mainly of cases in which the application of 
the law is clear.33 As an example, consider the duties imposed upon private 
landowners by the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the 
Act makes it an offense for any person to “take any [endangered] species 
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States.”34 Section 
(19) of the Act tells us what Congress meant by this broad language: “The term 
‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”35 Thus, if a landowner 
 
LEGAL THEORY 156 (1992); Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258–60 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). Jeremy Waldron (like 
Justice Scalia) says the judge should focus instead on “plain meaning” and not legislative intent. 
See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 79 (1999). H.L.A. Hart did not take a firm 
position on this issue, but his Holmes Lectures do focus only on statutory text. Hart, Law and 
Morals, supra note 1, at 606–07. Fuller assumed that Hartian positivism was textualist. Fuller, 
supra note 3, at 662. 
 31. Compare, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991) (Stevens, J.) (focusing 
on legislative expectations, as the Court has traditionally done), with id. at 404 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (maintaining that the Court has a “regular method” of statutory interpretation that the 
Justices ought to follow in every case). 
 32. Compare Frank Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at xxi, 
xxii-xxiv (advocating the benefits of a system of straightforward rules of interpretation that does 
not focus on legislative intent), John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from 
the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1680 (2001) (citing to the separation of judicial and 
legislative branches within the Constitution as problematic in endorsing a faithful agency theory 
about judge interpretation), and SCALIA, supra note 11, at 23–25 (all supporting the new 
textualism as the methodology that best represents the conventions of statutory interpretation), 
with John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1373, 1374, 1376, 1379, 1381, 1983 (1992) (arguing that courts need to be guided by 
congressional assumptions as well as positive expectations in statutory cases). See also Diane L. 
Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 19 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 
493, 495, 497 (1995) (detailed analysis of Stevens’s focus on congressional expectations and 
purposes, including the observation that Congress frequently overrode cases to implement 
Stevens’s dissenting views). 
 33. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 132; see also id. at 123 (“There will indeed be 
plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general expressions are clearly 
applicable.”); id. at 124 (referring to “the great mass of ordinary cases” in which legal rules work 
“smoothly”). 
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. § 1532(19). 
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shoots, ensnares, or traps a spotted owl (an endangered species), she would be 
in violation of the statute, based upon simple logic: to “shoot” an endangered 
species is by operation of § (19) to “take” that species, and § 9(a)(1)(B) says 
the law forbids anyone to “take” the species. 
Based upon conventions of word use as well as logic, even imaginative 
harms to endangered animals would fall athwart the statutory command. So if a 
deranged landowner smacked a spotted owl with a shovel, she would likewise 
be in violation. While § (19) does not specifically mention smacking an animal 
with a shovel, and common parlance does not say that to smack an owl with a 
shovel is to “take” that owl, the definition of “take” in § (19) is broad enough 
to include her conduct. Thus, she surely “harmed” the animal by smacking it 
with a shovel, and in the process she probably also “pursued” and may even 
have “harassed” the poor animal. No reasonable judge—neither Scalia nor 
Stevens—would quarrel with this interpretation. These various applications 
yield a coherent regulatory regime of uncontroversial applications of a rule. 
This regime of relatively clear applications is binding on all of us, whether or 
not we agree with the normative aims of the statute or believe that the burdens 
it imposes on us all are worthwhile. This tidy array of objectively 
determinable, and predictable, applications of the statute constitutes what we 
call the rule of law. 
H.L.A. Hart would characterize the foregoing cases as falling in the legal 
“core” of the statutory directive; falling within the “penumbra” rather than the 
core of the statute might be another variation.36 Would the § 9(a)(1)(B) rule 
apply to a landowner who cut down the trees in a forest that was an important 
habitat and breeding area for the endangered owl species? Although “destroy 
habitat” is not listed as a definition of “take,” might this conduct be considered 
an example of “harm”? By destroying habitat, the landowner is “harming” the 
endangered species and particular animals—and indeed harming the species 
and many particular animals more than if he were to “pursue” or “capture” one 
of the animals of that species.37 On the other hand, the verbs listed in the 
statutory definition of “take”—“harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect”—collectively might be read as various ways that a 
landowner would engage in purposeful conduct targeted at endangered 
animals. It would not be illogical to say that conduct, such as tree-clearing, that 
 
 36. Hart, supra note 1, at 607 (setting forth the core/penumbra dichotomy in the context of 
his discussion of the no-vehicles-in-the-park ordinance: “There must be a core of settled meaning, 
but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously 
applicable nor obviously ruled out. These cases will each have some features in common with the 
standard case; they will lack others or be accompanied by features not present in the standard 
case.”). 
 37. To be sure, § 9(a)(1)(B) might be read as focused on a particular animal and not on the 
entire species; one does not “take” an entire species, so much as one “takes” a particular animal, 
though denying habitat needed for breeding does “harm” specific animals as well as the species. 
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is not aimed at hurting endangered species and only does so incidentally, is not 
“harm” in the same way that shooting, trapping, or even smacking the animal 
with a shovel is. If so, tree-cutting that incidentally destroys habitat does not 
fall within the statutory meaning. 
The destruction-of-habitat application might be an example of what H.L.A. 
Hart called the “hard case,” where strict legal argumentation does not provide a 
clear answer.38 In hard cases, the judge must make new law interstitially, the 
way common law judges do for cases not covered by precedent or by clear 
reasoning from precedent.39 Where the law runs out, the judge must make a 
policy choice, according to Hart and other leading positivist theorists.40 
Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Scalia agrees with Professor Hart on this score as 
well: especially where the statute is open-textured, the judge has no choice but 
to make law, interstitially.41 But if a judge is filling in the gaps of the law with 
policy judgments, is that not contrary to the positivist commitment to 
understanding law as conventional and not moral in application? The positivist 
answer to this quandary is that society has the option of vesting judges, like 
legislators, with discretion to fill in legal gaps, so long as that gap-filling role is 
justified by conventional guidelines established by social fact and not by the 
judge’s moral philosophy.42 
There is another angle for hard cases, however. Most of the (arguably) 
hard cases the Supreme Court faces are ones where an agency has interpreted 
 
 38. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 273 (describing “hard cases” as ones “where 
the existing law fails to dictate any decision as the correct one”); JOSEPH RAZ, Law and Value in 
Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, 180, 181 (1979) (describing “unregulated” disputes as 
ones that “do not have a correct legal answer”). 
 39. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 1, at 272 (“If in such cases the judge is to reach a 
decision and is not, as Bentham once advocated, to disclaim jurisdiction or to refer the points not 
regulated by the existing law to the legislature to decide, he must exercise his discretion and make 
law for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled law.”). 
 40. Id. at 272–73; RAZ, Law and Value in Adjudication, supra note 38, at 197; SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 248. 
 41. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing a degree of “lawmaking” left to judges in cases of statutory interpretation, the extent 
of which depends on the “relative specificity or generality of [Congress’s] statutory commands”); 
see Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s 
Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 150, 178 (2008). 
 42. See Hart, supra note 1, at 612 (positing that judges must make policy choices in the hard 
statutory cases, but indicating that judges make those choices by reference to the aims and 
purposes of the statute). Many academics, myself included, have too readily identified both Scalia 
and positivism as “formalist,” but if formalism entails the notion that judicial decision-making is 
always hemmed in with constraining rules of law, that is clearly not the view of either Professor 
Hart or Justice Scalia. See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 247 (demonstrating that Hart 
was a landmark anti-formalist); Hart, supra note 1, at 608, 614–15 (Hart’s embrace of the realist 
critique of formalism). 
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the statute.43 Where the agency’s interpretation is contrary to the statute’s 
proper legal meaning, the role of the positivist judge is to correct the agency 
and veto its erroneous construction. But where the agency interpretation really 
addresses a hard case, where the interpreter must make an interstitial policy 
judgment, Justices Stevens and Scalia both believe the judge should go along 
with any reasonable agency construction, though perhaps for somewhat 
different positivist reasons. Justice Stevens authored Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, where the Court required judicial deference to the 
rules issued by agencies pursuant to congressional delegations of lawmaking 
authority.44 Justice Scalia avidly supported Chevron as well.45 Both Stevens 
and Scalia understand deference in jurisprudential (positivist) terms: in hard 
cases, agencies accountable to Congress and the President are the more 
legitimate institution to make policy judgments than Article III judges, who are 
not directly accountable to the electoral and political process.46 
We are now prepared to consider legal positivism in light of the issue in 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home. Recall that § 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act 
says no person can “take” an endangered species; “take” is defined in the 
statute to mean “harm” and many other activities. Implementing the statute and 
also having the force of law itself, the Department of Interior’s 1975 
regulation, as revised in 1981, defines “harm” in the statutory definition of 
“take” as any activity that “actually injures or kills” endangered species, 
including actions that “significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, 
which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; 
significant environmental modification or degradation . . . .”47 Under that 
definition of harm, private landowners that disrupt breeding patterns by 
destroying significant habitat for an endangered species are in violation of § 
9(a)(1)(B). 
 
 43. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1093–94 (2008) (reporting that 1,014 cases, more than half of the Court’s workload, were 
statutory cases where an agency had delivered an interpretation available to the Court in the years 
1984 through 2006). 
 44. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 
(2001). 
 45. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–41 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(providing a ringing reaffirmation of Chevron and castigating the Court for departing from what 
Scalia considered the Court’s established practice of applying deference broadly). 
 46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); Frederick Liu, Chevron as 
a Doctrine of Hard Cases 28, 33–34 (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878943. 
 47. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26, 
1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)). 
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The question before the Supreme Court in Sweet Home was whether the 
statute trumped the Department’s understanding of “harm.” Under positivist 
premises, Justice Scalia would have deferred to the Department’s 
understanding if he had considered this a hard or penumbral case where the 
(statutory) law runs out.48 But he did not. Joined by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Scalia concluded in his dissent 
that the application of § 9’s anti-take rule to farmers and ranchers who 
destroyed essential habitat was clearly beyond the legal meaning of the 
statute.49 While six Justices went the other way and joined Justice Stevens’s 
equally positivist opinion for the Court (which upheld the agency), this did not 
bother Justice Scalia in the least. He was certain that the standard conventional 
tools for discerning legal meaning all supported his somewhat narrower 
reading of the statutory language and that the majority Justices were simply 
wrong. 
Justice Scalia’s main point was that because “take” as a matter of both 
common law and common parlance involves aggressive activity targeted at a 
particular animal, the ordinary meaning of § 9(a)(1)(B) does not cover property 
development that only incidentally “harms” an endangered species, as through 
disruption of its habitat.50 He further argued that his narrow understanding of 
“take” was more consistent with the way that precise term was used elsewhere 
in both the ESA and in other statutes.51 Indeed, Justice Scalia maintained that 
his interpretation better fits with the structure of the statute.52 These are all 
conventional sources for discerning statutory meaning, and so Scalia’s dissent 
fit snugly within the positivist methodology. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens justified the Department’s 
interpretation by invoking the same kinds of conventional sources that Justice 
Scalia had marshaled. Like Scalia, Stevens treated the Act itself as law under 
our nation’s consensus-based rule of recognition; likewise, Stevens treated the 
agency rule as law pursuant to Congress’s well-recognized power to delegate 
lawmaking authority to agencies, unless inconsistent with the statute.53 And, 
also like Scalia, Stevens invoked those aids to interpretation that have been 
accepted within our polity, namely, text, structure, precedent, and so forth. 
Thus, in response to Justice Scalia’s argument that the Department’s 
 
 48. Because Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to the Department to implement § 
9, there was “law” to apply in the Case of the Spotted Owl, namely the regulation. But the issue 
in the case was whether the meaning of the statute was inconsistent with the agency rule, and so a 
separate issue of law was what the statute meant. 
 49. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714–36 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 717–18. 
 51. Id. at 721–23 (invoking presumption of consistent usage). 
 52. Id. at 723–24 (invoking whole act canon). 
 53. Id. at 690–98 (Stevens, J., majority opinion). 
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application of the anti-take provision went beyond the common law usage of 
the term, Justice Stevens responded that ordinary and common law meanings 
are superseded when Congress has specifically defined the term, as it has in the 
ESA, and that the ordinary meaning of “harm” supported the Department.54 
Justice Scalia countered with a caveat that congressional definitions should 
be read narrowly when they are in derogation of established meanings and with 
an argument that “harm” should be read to be similar to the other verbs in the 
definition, all of which entail the targeting of a specific animal.55 Justice 
Stevens replied that such a narrow reading of “harm” would render it statutory 
surplusage because a narrow reading of harm would simply duplicate the 
coverage of the other categories (trap, wound, harass, etc.).56 
Justice Stevens also pointed to legislative history contemplating that the 
anti-take provision of the endangered species bill would regulate habitat 
destruction by private parties—but Justice Scalia powerfully responded that the 
House and Senate sponsors of the legislation represented that the problem of 
habitat destruction would be solved by other provisions on the law.57 Section 
7(a) specifically barred federal agencies from supporting projects that 
threatened critical habitat for endangered species,58 and § 5 authorized the 
Department to use the government’s eminent domain power to secure habitat 
needed by endangered species.59 The legislative history invoked by Justice 
Scalia indicated that the original statutory scheme was probably inconsistent 
with the Department’s harm regulation. 
Justice Stevens did not have a good response to the legislative history of 
the 1973 Act—but he found support in subsequent amendments to the statute.60 
After 1975, Congress rejected a number of bills seeking to override the 
 
 54. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697–98, n.10 (invoking interpretive direction canon and 
ordinary meaning canon for definitional term “harm”). 
 55. Id. at 719–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking noscitur a sociis canon). 
 56. Id. at 698 n.11 (Stevens, J., for the Court). 
 57. Id. at 727–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting floor speeches by both the House and 
Senate sponsors of the bills that were the basis for the Endangered Species Act of 1973). 
 58. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 (“Each Federal agency shall . . . 
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . .”). 
 59. Id. § 1534(a)(1)–(2) (“To carry out such a program, the appropriate Secretary—shall use 
the land acquisitions and other authority under the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 . . . [and] is 
authorized to acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein, and 
such authority shall be in addition to any other land acquisition authority vested in him.”). 
 60. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700–01 (Stevens, J., majority opinion) (referring to the 
amendment of 16 U.S.C. § 1539 in 1982, which allowed for limited circumstances in which a 
permit could be granted where the action at issue might normally violate the Act). 
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Department’s broad interpretation.61 When Congress did act, in the 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, it amended § 10 of the statute 
to require the Department to exempt landowners from the anti-take provision if 
they could show that the habitat-protection rule denied them important use of 
their land and if they would follow a plan to minimize the deleterious effect on 
endangered species.62 The legislative history of the 1982 Amendments 
established that revised § 10 of the Endangered Species Act built upon, and 
implicitly ratified, the Department’s anti-take interpretation.63 Justice Scalia 
denounced the majority’s reliance on the 1982 Amendments but had no 
response to Justice Stevens’s argument that Congress in 1982 built upon and 
implicitly ratified the Department’s earlier interpretation. 
Both Justice Stevens, for the Sweet Home majority, and Justice Scalia, for 
the dissenters, presented their arguments in classic positivist terms. Each 
learned jurist made a detailed case for his interpretation of the Endangered 
Species Act, based upon conventional sources almost universally accepted 
within our legal culture—namely, ordinary meaning, deductions from the 
whole statute and even the larger U.S. Code, binding Supreme Court 
precedents, legislative history, the statutory purpose, and agency constructions. 
Of course, they reached different conclusions—but that is not too alarming: 
very often, the conventional sources will point in more than one direction. As 
H.L.A. Hart said, in the hard cases, the law will run out and the judge will have 
to exercise discretion to fill in the gap.64 
But what is strikingly odd about the debate in the Case of the Spotted Owl 
is that neither Stevens nor Scalia conceded that this was a “hard case.” To be 
sure, Justice Stevens came close. He noted that he had a lower standard to meet 
in affirming the agency: the Department’s interpretation did not have to be one 
that the Court would have reached, but only a reasonable understanding within 
the range of interpretations permitted by the statutory text.65 But as his 
majority opinion moved through the conventional sources, Justice Stevens 
seemed increasingly persuaded that the Department’s interpretation was also 
 
 61. Brief for the Petitioners, at 31a–36a, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859) (Solicitor General’s brief, recounting congressional 
deliberations after the “harm” regulation was promulgated). 
 62. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1422–24 
(1982) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2006)). 
 63. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700–01 (majority invoking whole act canon in indicating that 
when Congress added an administrative process providing relief for farmers and ranchers whose 
projects would incidentally harm the habitat of endangered species, Congress was relying on the 
Department’s interpretation of “harm”); id. at 703 n.17 (Congress also relied on the Department’s 
understanding when it amended the law in 1978). 
 64. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 65. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700, 703–04, 708. 
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hardwired into the statute, especially after the 1982 Amendments.66 For the 
majority, this was not a hard case; it appeared that the agency interpretation 
would have prevailed anyway. Justice Scalia unequivocally found this to be an 
easy case—but easy to reach the opposite conclusion: that the agency was dead 
wrong and that “take” did not entail untargeted habitat destruction. 
It is odd enough that judges applying the same sources would have reached 
such diametrically opposed conclusions, and with no one willing to admit that 
this was a hard case and that interpreters were essentially making law. This 
oddity is even deeper. Based on the conventional sources alone, it seems to me 
that Justice Stevens was simply wrong about the 1973 Act: it prohibited habitat 
destruction for federally supported projects, as § 7(a) specifically said, but did 
not implicitly prohibit habitat destruction by private landowners under § 9(a).67 
Justice Scalia’s law clerk found the smoking gun, namely, the House and 
Senate sponsors’ explanation for the original structure of the Act. So good for 
Justice Scalia (and the law clerk)—except that, in my view, Justice Scalia was 
simply wrong about the 1982 Amendments. Based on the same kind of 
legislative materials Scalia used to explain the 1973 Act, Stevens cogently 
demonstrated that the 1982 Amendments built upon and meant to ratify the 
Department’s 1975 regulation. 
This deepens the positivist mystery: not only did both Stevens and Scalia 
view this as an easy case from a positivist perspective, but considering only the 
conventional sources each Justice clearly got the decision wrong in an 
important respect. Not only was the case harder than any of the Justices 
conceded, but each side was blind to the easy features of the case that cut 
against the result for which each side voted. Something more was going on, 
and Justice Scalia, typically, suggested what it probably was. 
In his new book, Scalia, who is in a good position to know, says that 
judges have a “tendency . . . to imbue authoritative legal texts with their policy 
preferences” and their personal moral philosophies.68 Does that explain the 
 
 66. Compare id. at 697 (indicating that the agency view only had to be “reasonable” for the 
Court to go along with it), with id. at 701 (finding that Congress accepted the agency’s view in 
the 1982 Amendments). 
 67. The same quandary was apparent in the D.C. Circuit panel that decided Sweet Home. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Initially, the 
panel went three different ways. Liberal Judge Mikva found the Department’s interpretation valid 
under both the 1973 Act and the Act as amended in 1982. Id. at 8–9 (Mikva, J., concurring). 
Conservative Judge Sentelle found the interpretation invalid under the Act as amended. Id. at 12 
(Sentelle, J., dissenting). Moderately conservative Judge Williams found the interpretation 
inconsistent with the 1973 Act but saved by the 1982 Amendments. Id. at 11 (Williams, J., 
concurring). So only Judge Williams got the conventional sources right—yet he changed his vote 
on rehearing. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1472 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., majority opinion) (invalidating the regulation, over the dissent of 
Judge Mikva) rev’d, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 68. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at xxviii. 
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Justices’ different interpretations in the Case of the Spotted Owl? Yes, it 
does—and the best evidence for that proposition comes in Justice Scalia’s 
Sweet Home dissent. At the beginning of his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia 
objected to the result reached by his colleagues—not on conventional legal 
grounds, but on grounds of political morality: “The Court’s holding that the 
hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands 
imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but 
upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological 
use.”69 This anti-socialist barb was not merely a signal that the dissenters’ 
votes were motivated by something other than the conventional sources 
traditionally deployed in statutory cases, but was a précis of the political 
philosophy that provided the organizing framework for the dissenting opinion. 
The baseline for Justice Scalia’s dissent is the political and moral 
philosophy of Sir William Blackstone, updated to understand the sagebrush 
rebellion of the 1990s, namely, the reaction by western ranchers and farmers to 
what they considered excessive federal interference with their control over 
their own property.70 A natural law thinker who viewed the law in moral, 
liberty-loving terms, Blackstone also provided a synthesis of the common law 
of the eighteenth century, which assured well-nigh absolute protection for 
landowners to do anything with their property that did not tangibly harm other 
landowners.71 In the last generation, the sagebrush/property rights social 
movement objected that environmental regulations violated this Blackstonian 
norm.72 President Ronald Reagan (1981–89), who appointed Justice Scalia to 
the Court and elevated Justice Rehnquist (a second Sweet Home dissenter) to 
Chief Justice, endorsed the property rights social movement during his term in 
office and, consistent with the views of its leaders, supported the movement’s 
notion that excessive environmental regulation was not only inefficient and 
anti-libertarian, but amounted to a “taking” of private property.73 
 
 69. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied to highlight the charge of socialist oppression). 
 70. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing 
Perceptions of Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 987 
(2005). On the origins and early activism of the property rights movement, see Nancie G. 
Marzulla, Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in A WOLF IN THE 
GARDEN: THE LAND RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 39 (Philip D. 
Brick and R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996). 
 71. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England *134–35 (1765) 
(providing an influential statement of the common law’s strong protection of property rights, 
grounded in natural law and resistant to regulation even when justified by the “general good of 
the whole community”). 
 72. Marzulla, supra note 70 (leading statement, by a property rights activist, of the origins 
and evolution of that social movement). 
 73. Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 
53 Fed. Reg. 8,859, 8,859, 8,861 (Mar. 18, 1988). See generally Nancie G. Marzulla, State 
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Now reconsider Justice Scalia’s Sweet Home dissent, which assumes a 
great deal more coherence and cogency when viewed through the normative 
lens described above. Although Congress defined the statutory term “take” 
very broadly, Scalia read the legislative definition as narrowly as possible, to 
be consistent with the common law (neo-Blackstonian) understanding of 
“take.”74 The legislative purpose to protect habitat was clearly and broadly 
stated on the face of the statute, but Justice Scalia narrowed that purpose by a 
reading of the statutory structure that reflected a Blackstonian preference for 
highly limited government: presumptively, landowners can use their property 
as they like, consistent with state common law of property and without 
“feudal” restrictions from federal bureaucrats.75 Under Justice Scalia’s 
common law assumptions, moreover, the broad regulatory ambit of the 1975 
“harm” regulation was inconsistent with Scalia’s view that excessive 
regulation required compensation under the Fifth Amendment.76 
Read against the Blackstonian baseline, the 1982 Amendments represented 
a natural safety valve for property owners, and not a ratification of agency 
overreaching. Scalia would have been willing to read revised § 10 of the 
statute to be a legislative “ratification” of the agency’s socialistic “harm” 
regulation only if there had been an exceptionally clear statement to that effect, 
which Congress did not provide.77 Responding to the Court’s reliance on 
legislative reports to read the 1982 Amendments more broadly, Justice Scalia 
closed his dissenting opinion with the view that the nation would be imperiled 
if members of Congress actually read and relied on the excessively detailed 
 
Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to “Environmental Takings”, 46 S.C. L. REV. 
613 (1995). 
 74. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 717–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making this point and citing 
Blackstone). 
 75. Blackstone, supra note 71, at *134–35. Responding to the environmental movement’s 
demand that costs to the environment justified federal regulation of land use during the Bush 41 
Administration, the property rights social movement specifically claimed that the new regulations 
represented a “new feudalism,” where land was encumbered by restrictions preventing efficient 
owners from putting land to its best use. John McClaughry, The New Feudalism, 5 ENVTL. L. 
675, 676–78 (1975); Bruce Yandle, Escaping Environmental Feudalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 517, 517 (1992). 
 76. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (expanding 
upon the Court’s Fifth Amendment “takings” law and suggesting, in dictum, that state regulations 
of property that went beyond the old common law of nuisance abatement might trigger just 
compensation requirements as regulatory takings); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at 134–
35 (recognizing power of eminent domain, but only with full compensation, only by explicit 
legislative action, and only with the utmost “caution” in the exercise of this exceptional power). 
 77. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 729–30 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For earlier cases where Justice Scalia required a clear statement, or even a 
super-clear statement, from Congress before he was willing to displace state property rules with 
federal policies, see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (Scalia, J.) 
and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
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stuff in these committee reports.78 In short, Sir William Blackstone trumped 
the members of the Senate and House Conference Committee that crafted the 
1982 Legislative Compromise. 
Justice Scalia made his dissenting case by toggling between his 
Blackstonian normative baseline and his conventional arguments. The 
conventional arguments, by themselves, were not decisive but become so when 
considered in light of the Blackstonian baseline. From Scalia’s point of view, 
the agency had the burden of demonstrating that Congress in either 1973 or 
1982 had affirmatively trumped state property rights with the agency’s 
intrusive regime; this was a burden the agency could not carry with general 
understandings about what “harm” might mean or the presumed “assumptions” 
of the 1982 Amendments. 
Likewise, Justice Stevens, for the majority, toggled between facts and 
norms, albeit without the colorful language deployed by the dissenters. And, of 
course, his toggling involved a different norm. Thus, Stevens anchored his 
interpretation upon the “green property” norm, the modern regulatory notion 
that landowners have, since 1970, been on notice that they cannot impose costs 
on the environment without expecting regulatory pushback.79 Rather than just 
blandly ruling that the statute was ambiguous enough to include the 
Department’s “harm” regulation, Justice Stevens brigaded that interpretation 
with immense legal support. It resulted in Justice Stevens’s clinching argument 
that Congress encoded the Department’s interpretation into revised § 10(a)—
that the Department could not easily have changed its “harm” regulation after 
1995.80 And his insistence, against the weight of the evidence, that the 
Department’s regulation was consistent with the 1973 Act can best be 
explained by the majority’s unsupported assumption that the landmark 
environmental statutes adopted between 1969 and 1978 transformed the public 
culture in this country and entrenched the green property idea.81 
The legisprudential toggling that both majority and dissenting Justices did 
in the Case of the Spotted Owl suggests several dilemmas for positivism as a 
persuasive account of American statutory jurisprudence. As Scott Shapiro has 
demonstrated, Hartian positivism is an anti-formalist approach to statutory 
 
 78. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. See PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT 129–35 (1993); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239, 243 
(1990); Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. 
REV. 299, 316, 362 (1995); David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for 
Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 314 (1988). 
 80. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 701–02. 
 81. On the normative transformation surrounding these environmental super-statutes, see 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 256, 263–64, 282–85, 294, 300–01 (2010). 
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interpretation, for it concedes and even celebrates the realist insight that the 
law runs out in a lot of cases, and judges then fill gaps in the law with policy 
judgments.82 This entails a lot of lawmaking discretion by nonelected, tenured-
for-life federal judges and justices. What social fact or practice authorizes this 
degree of discretionary judicial authority? Neither Hart nor Scalia nor Shapiro 
nor any other legal positivist has, to my knowledge, demonstrated a social 
practice sanctioning or even tolerating this view of judging, and in recent 
decades there seems to be a strong social norm against any admission of 
Hartian discretion.83 
Indeed, the behavior of the Justices in the Case of the Spotted Owl 
illustrates and confirms this strong social norm. The issue in the case was one 
of great public moment—and all nine Justices made every effort to indicate 
that there was law to apply and that judges or administrators were not making 
policy that had not been endorsed by Congress. The closeting of competing 
understandings of political morality in Sweet Home is testimony to the power 
of the social understanding that there are legally determinable answers in most 
cases involving major statutory issues. In short, judges in our society are 
pressured to turn hard cases into easy cases and at least pretend that the law has 
not run out. Therefore, at least in the United States, it is not clear that the social 
consensus foundation for Hartian positivism has been established; the burden 
of course is on the defenders, who may or may not be able to carry it. 
Put aside the thorny question of whether the social foundation for hard 
cases exists in American political culture and focus on the dispute about the 
meaning of the Endangered Species Act in Sweet Home. For none of the 
Justices did the application of law ultimately depend on the conventions that 
are widely accepted in our legal and political culture. All of the Justices 
thought there was a right answer in the case; they reached different right 
answers, and I have tried to demonstrate that not a single Justice mounts a 
persuasive case based only on conventional legal criteria. Both majority and 
dissenting opinions rested, at bottom, on competing political philosophies. In 
short, the application of law depended upon the normative framework through 
which judges and agencies pick and choose among conventional sources and 
 
 82. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 246–48. 
 83. For an ambitious historical statement against the Hartian assumption as an explanation of 
our traditions, see John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 5, 78–79, 85–86, (2001) (describing the tradition, throughout American history and especially 
during the founding era, as demanding that judges be nothing more than “faithful agents” of the 
legislature). For a counter-narrative demonstrating greater public tolerance for normative judicial 
engagement with statutes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings 
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 991–
93 (2001). 
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calibrate their selected canons to fit with the moral philosophy, rather than 
vice-versa.84 
The Case of the Spotted Owl is already a statutory interpretation classic 
because of the intense debate between Justices Stevens and Scalia, each 
brandishing dozens of conventional sources of statutory meaning. Accordingly, 
Sweet Home is one of the statutory interpretation anchors for the legal 
positivist canon—yet the debate within the Court toggles intensely between 
factual arguments and normative baselines. Sweet Home is far from 
idiosyncratic in this regard. In most, perhaps all, of the hard statutory cases, 
judges toggle between conventional sources and competing—often closeted—
normative visions.85 In my view, neither the conventional sources nor the 
normative philosophies do all the work for the clashing opinions.86 At the risk 
of mixing metaphors, facts and norms are like two blades in a scissors, each 
working with the other to do the cutting. 
The problem of closeted norms seems to me most severe for those 
positivist theories maintaining that law and legal interpretation must operate 
exclusively by reference to social facts and conventions, which exclude norms 
and morality.87 The pervasiveness of norms is particularly inconsistent with 
Justice Scalia’s presentation of positivist statutory interpretation, which is why 
I called this lecture “Nino’s Nightmare.” The problem also afflicts positivist 
theories which maintain that law and legal interpretation may operate by 
reference to social facts and conventions that include moral precepts.88 There is 
no generally accepted convention in American social or legal culture that says 
judges should impose their moral vision upon statutes in hard cases, and there 
is certainly no convention that says judges should separate easy from hard 
cases based upon their moral evaluation of the different interpretations. So the 
 
 84. While the conventional legal sources are not completely manipulable, in the hard cases, 
there will be enough variety of legal sources for either side to have conventional materials to 
work with and mold into a line of argument that its partisans find persuasive. 
 85. For other classic examples, see, for instance, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584, 
625–26 (2009), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 
616, 629, n.7, 671 (1987) (affirmative action); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56, 278, 
302 (2006) (preemption of state death with dignity law); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 159, 163, 181 (2000) (tobacco regulation); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15, 132–33, 140 (2001) (arbitration of labor disputes). 
 86. However strongly Scalia is attached to the Blackstonian baseline in cases like Sweet 
Home, he would probably have deferred to the agency if the conventional sources had been more 
conclusively supportive of the agency. 
 87. These theories are considered an “exclusive” version of legal positivism. See RAZ, supra 
note 13, at 37–52; SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 267–73. 
 88. These theories are considered an “inclusive” version of legal positivism. Jules L. 
Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 53–59 (2011); see also ANTHONY 
SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 269–94 (1998) (arguing for an 
inclusive legal positivism). 
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nonconventional but overwhelming force of norms and morality in cases like 
Sweet Home poses a challenge to all the leading positivist theories of statutory 
interpretation. 
II.  NORMATIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INCONVENIENT FACTS 
Perhaps inspired in part by H.L.A. Hart’s Holmes Lectures, Ronald 
Dworkin (who was a third-year law student at the time of those lectures) has 
devoted his career to jurisprudence, and with great success. He succeeded Hart 
as the Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and as the leading Anglo-American 
jurisprude. Professor Dworkin also is the leading critic of Hart’s positivism 
and is the successor of Lon Fuller (his law school professor) as the leading 
exponent of what most jurisprudes call a “natural law” theory.89 I do not follow 
that usage. Classic natural law theory, such as that espoused by St. Thomas 
Aquinas and his successors, maintains that immoral law is no law whatsoever 
and that valid law must be applied according to the objective morality that is 
the basis for such laws.90 Unlike the classic natural lawyers, Dworkin (like 
Fuller) emphasizes the norms and principles integral with our legal traditions, 
not external to it.91 For this reason, I prefer the term normativism to refer to 
theorists who maintain that the operation of law depends upon normative 
judgments apart from those marked by conventions. Such a term is broad 
enough to include the interpretations of both Thomas Aquinas and Ronald 
Dworkin. 
However his legisprudence is labeled, Professor Dworkin would 
understand the debate in the Case of the Spotted Owl very differently than 
most positivists view it. Justices Stevens and Scalia both present their debate as 
an “empirical” disagreement about what the Hartian sources of law require in 
this case. As I have demonstrated above, the debate is actually more deeply 
normative—what Dworkin would call a “theoretical” disagreement about the 
“grounds” of law.92 To resolve the case against the agency, Scalia interprets 
the “grounds” of law to be substantially Blackstonian: the old common law of 
property, preserved largely at the state level, is the starting point for law; 
statutory disturbances to the old common law rules are to be enforced to the 
letter, but not one article or comma beyond what the statute explicitly 
 
 89. For such an assessment, see, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 284–295. 
 90. II THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMMA THEOLOGICA at Q. XC, art. ii (1485) (various sources of 
law, emphasizing the eternal law which is the basis for just and right human laws). 
 91. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 225–75 (rejecting the positivist “plain fact view” of law and 
advancing “law as integrity” as an internally superior understanding of what law is). 
 92. Id. at 3–15. As an example of a theoretical disagreement, Dworkin invokes the earlier 
ESA case, TVA v. Hill. See id. at 20–23. In my view, the debate in Sweet Home is a much cleaner 
example of theoretical disagreement than TVA v. Hill. 
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requires.93 To resolve the case in favor of the agency, Stevens interprets the 
“grounds” of law to be substantially Rooseveltian: statutory norms have 
replaced the common law as the legal baseline, and environmental statutes are 
to be applied liberally to achieve their purposes of non-degradation and 
renewal.94 
Professor Dworkin would have smiled when he read Scalia’s opening barb 
that the “simplest farmer” ought not be “conscripted for national zoological 
use,” for it brings his point out into the open. While it is ridiculous to view the 
debate as one pitting common law liberty for the yeoman farmer against 
socialist central planners, Scalia’s barb, followed by his relentlessly 
Blackstonian focus, suggests that even the Court’s most uber-positivist judge 
understood the Case of the Spotted Owl to be not just an interpretation of the 
statute, but also an interpretation of what Dworkin calls the “grounds” of law.95 
Dworkin’s smile would have faded as he waded (or skimmed) through the 
many pages of legal analysis in Sweet Home. Exhausting themselves by trading 
canons of statutory construction and references to legislative history, Stevens 
and Scalia would have provided a more illuminating debate if they had pursued 
the larger project suggested by Scalia’s barb. According to Dworkin, that 
debate should have asked the larger question: Is the Department’s coercive 
application of the statute to restrict the liberties of the Sweet Home plaintiffs 
morally justified by past political decisions?96 Scalia’s indignant dissent 
suggests that he strongly believed the coercion was not justified; Stevens’s 
increasingly passionate majority opinion suggests that he considered the 
coercion amply justified. 
What Professor Dworkin calls “law as integrity” presupposes a different 
inquiry than that pursued by positivist theories. As with Hartian theory, 
Dworkinian theory operates at two levels. At the meta-level, Dworkin 
“supposes that law’s constraints benefit society not just by providing 
predictability or procedural fairness, or in some other instrumental way, but by 
securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes their community more 
genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the political power 
it does.”97 Dworkin maintains that his meta-theory is superior to the positivist 
meta-theory. Dworkin’s defense rests upon his conception of a legitimate and 
good political community.98 What creates a political community is not an 
 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 72–81. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
 95. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 4–7; see also SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 284–
87, 295–304 (providing a useful explication of Dworkin’s deployment of this terminology). 
 96. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 96–97. 
 97. Id. at 95–96. 
 98. Id. at 167–216 (setting forth the idea that the notion of community can be personified, 
and that such personification allows a community to strive for ideals rooted in integrity). 
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abstract (and largely meaningless) social contract that may have been 
established in a bygone era, but instead the shared and interconnected lives that 
we lead and that are enriched by our shared history. In a “true community,” he 
argues, “legitimacy—the right of a political community to treat its members as 
having obligations in virtue of collective community decisions—is to be found 
not in the hard terrain of contracts or duties of justice or obligations of fair play 
that might hold among strangers . . . but in the more fertile ground of fraternity, 
community, and their attendant obligations.”99 
Professor Dworkin then contrasts his understanding of community from 
the one he attributes to positivists. Thus, he distinguishes between a rulebook 
community and a community of principle.100 Reflecting positivist 
jurisprudence, the former “supposes that members of a political community 
accept a general commitment to obey rules established in a certain way that is 
special to that community.”101 The latter “insists that people are members of a 
genuine political community only when they accept that their fates are linked 
in the following strong way: they accept that they are governed by common 
principles, not just by rules hammered out in political compromise.”102 Law in 
both kinds of community rests upon shared understandings—but in Dworkin’s 
preferred community of principle the shared understandings are normative 
rather than just procedural. Furthermore, of course, Dworkin assumes that 
everyone would rather live in a community of principle (where we are 
connected and happy) than in a rulebook community (how boring). 
Having made a brilliant argument in support of his meta-theory, Professor 
Dworkin then sets forth the implications of the meta-theory for interpretive 
methodology. In statutory interpretation, law as integrity requires the judge as 
a “creative . . . partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best 
way, the statutory scheme Congress began. He will ask himself which reading 
of the act . . . shows the political history including and surrounding that statute 
in the better light.”103 Following Fuller quite closely, Dworkin also insists that 
his judge “interprets not just the statute’s text but its life, the process that 
begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment.”104 
 
 99. Id. at 206. 
 100. Id. at 209–10 (rulebook community, associated with convention-based theories of law, 
including positivist theories) and 211–15 (community of principle, associated with law as 
integrity). 
 101. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 210. 
 102. Id. at 211. 
 103. Id. at 313. Dworkin proceeded to apply law as integrity to an exegesis of the Endangered 
Species Act and its application to the Case of the TVA Dam, which he would have exempted 
from the plain meaning of the statute. Id. at 337–47. 
 104. Id. at 348 (paraphrasing LON FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 8–10 (1940), in saying 
that statutes, like stories, change over time and enjoy a “process of becoming”). 
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Consider the application of law as integrity to the Case of the Spotted Owl. 
Arising out of the environmental movement and its endorsement of the 
biodiversity norm, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is, by Dworkin’s 
account, our nation’s bipartisan commitment to a policy of species 
conservation.105 With due respect to the continuing Blackstonian features of 
our post-New Deal legal commitments (for example, the continued respect for 
private property), Dworkin would sharply dispute Scalia’s eagerness to read 
the statute narrowly. The biodiversity purpose of the law should be broadly 
applied, not because a canon of construction says so or even because Dworkin 
and his fellow readers of the New York Review of Books believe that purpose is 
in the long term interest of the world and of the nation. It should be broadly 
construed because that is the best reading of our public commitments and our 
history. 
To be sure, law as integrity would credit Scalia with making some serious 
points. As enacted in 1973, the Endangered Species Act seems to protect 
habitat primarily, and perhaps exclusively, through the § 5 authorization for 
government acquisition of habitat through eminent domain106 and through the 
§ 7(a) prohibition against federal agency projects that deprive endangered 
species of critical habitat.107 Section 9(a) (the provision prohibiting “taking” of 
an endangered species)108 might be read to augment the habitat protections of 
§§ 5 and 7, but is that the best reading, consistent with our nation’s historic 
commitments to private property? Surely, the American public was not focused 
on this detail, and to the extent members of Congress were focused on it, they 
seem to have assumed that §§ 5 and 7 would address the habitat problem, as 
Scalia’s legislative history indicated. 
Additionally, law as integrity would ask this fundamental question: Did the 
nation’s shared commitment to the biodiversity principle justify the 
fundamental shift in legal rules applicable to farmers and ranchers using and 
developing their property? If “take” (and “harm”) were construed to regulate 
only targeted harms to particular endangered animals, as the plaintiffs in Sweet 
Home urged, there would be minimal disruption to private property rights. But 
if “take” (and “harm”) were construed to regulate habitat disruption as well, 
like the agency said, then property law would be fundamentally altered. Law as 
integrity, as I read it, ought to require more democratic deliberation before 
 
 105. See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 339 (drawing from the discussion of TVA v. Hill, which 
was an application of the Endangered Species Act, as was Sweet Home). Complementing 
Dworkin’s account are the facts that the statute was proposed by Republican President Richard 
Nixon, was enacted by virtually unanimous bipartisan majorities in a Democratic Congress, and 
was implemented broadly by the Interior Department of Nixon’s GOP successor, President 
Gerald Ford. 
 106. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a). 
 107. Id. § 1536(a). 
 108. Id. § 1538. 
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endorsing such a fundamental shift in the balance of two important principles 
(the old principle that property owners have great freedom to use their land and 
the new principle of preserving biodiversity). 
Like Justice Stevens did in Sweet Home, however, the Dworkinian 
interpreter would then examine the continuing deliberations, once Congress 
and the public became aware that a habitat-preservation rule could often be 
very costly. In 1978, and responding to TVA v. Hill, Congress addressed this 
concern in the context of § 7(a) by creating an executive department committee 
to exempt federal projects when habitat protection would be too expensive.109 
And in the 1982 Amendments, Congress addressed the same concern in the 
context of section 9(a) by directing the Department to exempt private projects 
that had the incidental (unintended) effect of harming habitat.110 In both 
statutory responses, farmers and ranchers raised their concerns, and in the 1982 
Amendments their congressional partisans agreed to retain the Department’s 
“harm” regulation but soften it with the expanded exemption in § 10(a).111 
In the end, law as integrity, as applied by Professor Dworkin, would 
probably agree with the Supreme Court in Sweet Home, but through a 
somewhat different reasoning process—one where the normative debate would 
have been uncloseted and robust. Immediately, I should add that a good case 
for Justice Scalia’s dissent can be constructed by reference to the methods of 
integrity, and indeed I believe that his dissent can and should be read through 
the lens of integrity. To be sure, this would make Nino’s Nightmare even more 
frightening than I earlier posited. Imagine his horror if Justice Scalia dreamed 
that he was morphing into Ronald Dworkin as he read his Sweet Home dissent 
to a hushed, and increasingly shocked, courtroom. 
Statutory interpretation, according to law as integrity, requires much more 
than an interpreter’s engagement with conventional legal sources; it also insists 
upon an interpretation of the statute’s ongoing history in a way that makes it 
the best statute it can be, and it also seems to entail a meta-interpretation of the 
nation’s political history, putting that history in its best light.112 Frankly, this 
seems like a very hard task, which is, apparently, why Dworkin calls his law as 
 
 109. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7, 92 Stat. 3759 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (1978)) (exempts from § 9 federal habitat-
threatening projects (like the TVA dam) if they are granted an exemption from § 7(a)’s rules for 
federal projects through a new procedure Congress created in 1978). 
 110. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1418 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)). 
 111. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (“The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he 
shall prescribe—any taking otherwise prohibited by 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title if such taking is 
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”). 
 112. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, 304–06 (highlighting the notion of meta-interpretation as 
central to the Dworkinian enterprise). 
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integrity judge “Hercules.”113 And it seems like an impossible task to hand off 
to judges and expect them to reach agreement, which creates problems for 
Dworkin’s famous neo-formalist position that, contrary to Hart, there are 
always “right answers” in law.114 Even if you put a gun to the head of Justice 
Scalia and required him to think and write just like Professor Dworkin as a 
matter of methodology, I have little doubt that Nino-Hercules would retain his 
strong opinion that the agency was wrong, while Ronnie-Hercules would say 
that it was right. Under law as integrity, either version of Hercules could make 
excellent arguments supporting the proposition that the community of principle 
supports his interpretation. 
More fundamentally, Nino-Hercules might reject the preference for a 
community of principle over a rulebook community that undergirds Dworkin’s 
meta-theory. Dworkin finds it self-evident that the community of principle is 
more consistent with American traditions than a rulebook community is.115 
Note, however, that this proposition involves factual investigation that 
Professor Dworkin does not even attempt. This is a big problem. Specifically, 
if the community of principle entails judicial opinions along the lines outlined 
by Dworkin, I think it much harder to justify by reference to American 
tradition, even under a meta-analysis that seeks to make it the best it can be. I 
doubt that American traditions would tolerate judges who put on the 
philosophical airs of Ronnie-Hercules.116 Even Chief Justice John Marshall, 
the greatest statutory as well as constitutional interpreter in our nation’s 
history, dared not pretend to be Hercules and declined to brigade his judicial 
opinions with explicit political philosophy.117 Scalia’s notion that judging 
 
 113. See DWORKIN, supra note 11. A name choice I have always found baffling. In Greek 
mythology, Hercules was very strong but not very smart, and certainly not the polymath genius a 
Dworkinian judge needs to be. So I’d have expected Hercules to have been a Dworkinian foil, the 
obtuse jurist who “strong-arms” desired meaning out of statutes, rather than a Dworkinian idol. If 
I were searching Greek mythology for a wise integrity-ridden judge, I’d choose the brainy Athena 
rather than the muscle-headed Hercules. 
 114. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–34 (1978); George C. Christie, 
Dworkin’s “Empire”, 1987 DUKE L.J. 157 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE (1986)). Christie suggests that Dworkin repeatedly fudges on the one-right-answer 
position at various points of Law’s Empire. Id. at 184. 
 115. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 211–16. 
 116. For an elaborate historical exegesis of America’s founding era and beyond, see SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 313–29, which concludes from that history that “any conception of 
law that requires for its implementation a great deal of philosophical competence, moral rectitude, 
and political homogeneity will clash irredeemably with such a legal structure” as our nation has 
created. Id. at 329; accord, Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 883, 899–
902 (2011) (reviewing Scott SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2010)). 
 117. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 995–97 (2001) 
(analysis of Marshall’s early statutory interpretation opinions, where the Chief Justice applied 
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ought to be presented as a simpler process of discovery rather than a 
complicated process of construction118 is one that is probably more congenial 
to American popular traditions and is more consistent with the assumptions of 
the legislative process, as reported by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman.119 
Indeed, Nino-Hercules would object to Ronnie-Hercules’s insistence that 
there must be a hard binary choice between a rulebook community and a 
community of principle. Instead, there is a third way of understanding of 
American political traditions, namely, a community of ordered liberty. Many 
thoughtful scholars and citizens maintain that the principle that Americans 
have held most dear, from the founding of the nation, is the principle of 
liberty.120 Among the fundamental liberties our country has protected is the 
freedom we have to be secure in our own homes and properties; “ordered 
liberty” reminds us that security entails regulation of property and conduct in 
the interest of society.121 A community of ordered liberty entails associational 
depth, but the associations within which we flourish are private ones and the 
role of government is to provide protection and structure for such private 
flourishing.122 
 
statutes in light of broader legal context, especially the law of nations, but did virtually no 
political theorizing). 
 118. Justice Scalia made exactly this move in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, where 
he explained Article III’s “judicial Power” in practice: 
That is the power ‘to say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 
(1803), not the power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as 
to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, 
which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than 
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. 
501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. 
 119. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: 
An Empirical Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (draft summer 2012, discussed and quoted with permission) (congressional 
drafters assume a much simpler approach to judging than Dworkin’s Hercules represents). 
 120. See, e.g., DAVID WOMERSLEY, LIBERTY AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2006) (a collection of essays, including a splendid one from Professor 
Gordon Wood, demonstrating the strong libertarian commitments of the founding generation). 
 121. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–7 (2005). 
 122. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 133–61 (1960) (detailing the 
necessity of order that society creates and how that necessity manifests itself as “abstract rules” 
we call law); F.A. HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 112–13 (1973) 
(discussing the purpose of law in the context of philosophy and how we understand order); see 
also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009) (reflecting a somewhat more positive and 
regulatory view of the subject). 
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The Sweet Home plaintiffs (and the Supreme Court dissenters) viewed 
their lawsuit against Secretary Babbitt in something like these principled 
terms: they were farmers and ranchers who wanted to work their land without 
harming anyone else, and without burdensome bureaucratic habitat rules 
encumbering their properties against routine use and development; their 
freedom of property use was not only foundational to their own lives, but also 
to the United States as a thriving political as well as economic community.123 
If Congress had wanted to impose such rules for a larger biodiversity purpose, 
it had the power to do so, though some of the plaintiffs may have thought the 
restrictions so great as to require the government to compensate them for 
effectively “taking” their property. But Congress had not done so. In the 1973 
Act, Congress protected habitat through other mechanisms, where the costs of 
habitat conservation were on the government.124 The Department’s 1975 
“harm” regulation, which was a short paragraph attached to a long rule about 
alligators and which sneaked through the notice-and-comment process with 
virtually no attention to its drastic consequences, went beyond Congress’s 
1973 deal, and the 1982 Amendments were not explicit enough to trump this 
fundamental principle of American political morality. 
Not only could Justice Scalia have presented his arguments as a meta-
interpretation in the Case of the Spotted Owl, but his crack about a farmer’s 
land being “conscripted to national zoological use”125 suggests that he was in 
fact engaged in a process of meta-interpretation. Each analytical move in his 
dissenting opinion fits snugly in a law as integrity exercise, albeit one 
grounded in very different principles than those followed by the Sweet Home 
majority or by Professor Dworkin. While Dworkin might view Scalia’s meta-
interpretivism (or my presentation of it) as terrible philosophy, the fact is that 
judges told to view law as integrity would tend to write the same kinds of 
opinions they do now. Calling the judges Hercules would not make their 
opinions much, if any, stronger.126 
Note the irony. H.L.A. Hart’s positivist theory of law does not necessarily 
reflect American social consensus, and the legal conventions it encourages 
 
 123. Brief for Respondents at 5, 37–38, 47–48, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for 
a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 130541.  
 124. Id. at 41, 46–48. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1534, 1536 (eminent domain and federal 
program protections for habitat, where the cost of protecting endangered species would be 
assumed by the whole nation), with 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (the “take” provision, imposing costs on 
private as well as public landowners, and notably missing any explicit reference to habitat 
protection). 
 125. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126. For a strong statement, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999) (relentless attack on the utility of moral philosophy in 
general and, even more, lawyers’ amateur deployment of it). Like H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law, 
Judge Posner’s Problematics originated as his Holmes Lectures (delivered in 1997). 
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judges to use are not doing much work in the hard cases that judges treat as 
easy cases, like the Case of the Spotted Owl. But if American judges are 
engaged in reasoning from deep premises of political morality in the hard 
cases, as Ronald Dworkin maintains, they tend to be engaged in partisan rather 
than purely legal exercises because of the polarized public debate over a wide 
array of issues and the wide range of principles from which judges might 
cherry-pick to support an interpretation that fits with their prior belief 
systems.127 
Neither legisprudence is an entirely satisfactory understanding of statutory 
interpretation—but neither can be dismissed entirely. As positivism teaches, 
the ordinary work of the law is factual and conventional.128 Following the 
accepted interpretive conventions, judges of all backgrounds find that most 
cases fall within the statutory core, including some cases that involve hard 
work by the judge to figure out the law’s solution to the case’s riddle. As 
normativism teaches, however, political morality and normative judgments 
must be made not only when cases fall within statutory penumbras, but also 
when judges have to decide whether value-laden cases fall within the core or 
within the penumbra.129 Whether judges admit it or not, they will decide the 
hard cases by reference to larger policies and principles, including principles of 
political morality. As the Case of the Spotted Owl illustrates, decision-making 
in normatively high-stakes cases will toggle between conventional legal 
analysis and normative evaluation. 
III.  LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AS A LEGISPRUDENCE OF TOGGLING 
Let us pause here to recall the argument that has been made. The analysis 
started with legal positivism developed by H.L.A. Hart. His convention-based 
view of law has the enormous virtue of usefulness; most everyday legal issues 
encountered by lawyers and judges are easy cases felling within law’s core, 
with hard cases generated by changed circumstances over time. Antonin Scalia 
is an out-of-the-closet positivist, as are the other Justices on the Supreme 
Court. An important problem with positivism, as illustrated by the Case of the 
Spotted Owl, is that judges typically insist on finding law in the hard cases—
 
 127. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for 
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (summarizing cultural cognition scholarship, which 
demonstrates that people respond to legal decisions and rules through the lens of preconceived 
cultural scripts that are hard to change); David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or 
Just Backlash? Evidence From a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 735, 746 
(2012) (similarly explaining the effect of institutional preferences in the face of polarizing 
decisions). 
 128. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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and they do so through a process that toggles between facts and norms, and 
between conventions and political philosophy. 
If statutory interpretation involves such a toggling between facts and 
norms, it is hard to consider it consistent with positivism, which maintains that 
“law” is established only by conventions and social facts, not by norms and 
political morality.130 One version of positivism maintains that norms can be 
relevant on the ground that convention allows or requires law to take account 
of them,131 but there is no uncontroversial convention or practice that supports 
the kind of values analysis that occurred in the Case of the Spotted Owl. 
Nino’s nightmare, again: the jurist who is most emphatic in claiming that legal 
interpretation must be stripped of judicial values and normative analysis is the 
one whose normative priors are easiest to spot. 
The normative turn in the Case of the Spotted Owl prompted a 
consideration of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. For the hard 
cases, law as integrity deepens our understanding of what judges are typically 
doing and even how they are thinking, albeit more crudely and with less 
information than Dworkin would like Herculean judges to have. Although 
Dworkin has not written about the Case of the Spotted Owl, one can easily 
imagine how law as integrity would analyze the issue presented by the case—
and in a manner that would better justify the result reached by the Court. 
Indeed, the dissenting opinion would have been more powerful if Nino-
Hercules had engaged in a more openly normative analysis. The dissenters had 
no conventional answer to the Court’s reliance on the 1982 Endangered 
Species Act Amendments. Their best argument would have been to defend 
their neo-Blackstonian baseline and argue that Congress needs to speak more 
clearly if it wants to impose huge costs onto farmers and ranchers, rather than 
stick with the original (1973) statutory scheme, where society as a whole 
absorbed the costs of protecting the habitat of endangered species.132 
But the Case of the Spotted Owl brought out a central problem with 
Dworkin’s meta-theory, which demands that political philosophy be grounded 
 
 130. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 131. This is the inclusive legal positivism described in Coleman, supra note 88, at 53–59. 
 132. That is, in the 1973 Act, §§ 5 and 7 were the provisions explicitly protecting habitat, the 
former through the government’s eminent domain power and the latter by limiting federal 
projects. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 889, 892. In both 
instances, the costs of protecting endangered species are dispersed generally (i.e., general taxes). 
Id. Section 9, which imposes costs more narrowly (i.e., on farmers and ranchers but not on urban 
dwellers and renters), did not specifically protect habitat. Id. at 87 Stat. 893. The agency’s 1975 
harm regulation expanded § 9 to join the habitat-protective policy of §§ 5 and 7, but at no cost to 
the government. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412–13 (Sept. 
26, 1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). The dissenters probably felt that that shift was unfair, 
and Justice Scalia could have used that as his baseline for reading the 1982 Endangered Species 
Act Amendments narrowly. 
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in a factual as well as normative account of our polity’s commitments. Ronnie-
Hercules and Nino-Hercules start off with vastly different understandings of 
American history and of the values that undergird our shared community. Each 
version of Hercules toggles between facts/conventions and norms/philosophy 
as he makes his case both for a theory of statutory interpretation and for the 
application of the statute in Sweet Home.133 
With a clear idea of how positivist and normativist legisprudences present 
themselves as distinctive, and—I hope—a clear idea of the problems each 
legisprudence faces in light of the toggling phenomenon, it is time to consider 
a theory that has not been treated as a distinctive jurisprudence, namely, legal 
process theory.134 Legal process theory is a distinctive legisprudence because it 
celebrates and indeed rests upon a pragmatic toggling between facts and 
norms.135 In other words, the fact-norm toggling that causes problems for 
positivism and normativism becomes the central feature for legal process. 
Legal process theory is a legisprudence of toggling—and not just between facts 
and norms, but also (and perhaps more importantly) between agencies and 
courts as situses of statutory interpretation, an even more important 
contribution that legal process theory has made to American legisprudence. 
The legal process approach is classically developed in teaching materials 
prepared by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks on The Legal Process.136 
Although neither scholar was a jurisprude, they worked closely with and were 
 
 133. Thus, Nino-Hercules says that American history and normative commitments support a 
strict textualism as a theory of statutory interpretation, and that application of that theory in Sweet 
Home requires judges to overrule the agency’s incorrect reading of the 1973 Act (even as 
amended). See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 230–33. Ronnie-Hercules says that our 
history and commitments support an integrity-based theory of statutory interpretation, and would 
probably have applied that theory to affirm the agency in Sweet Home. See DWORKIN, supra note 
11, at 249, 255. 
 134. The neglect of legal process theory by scholars of jurisprudence is being rectified by 
some excellent treatments in the last generation. See, e.g., SEBOK, supra note 88 (arguing that 
legal process is an important contribution to positivist jurisprudence, filling in important holes in 
H.L.A. Hart’s understanding of the exercise of discretion); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the 
Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987) (arguing that 
legal process theory was an important precursor for Dworkin’s law as integrity; for example, it 
created the notion that interpretation involves consideration of general policies and principles as 
well as specific texts and purposes); Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and 
Sacks (Univ. of Va. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2011-44, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959406 (arguing that legal process is not simply a 
positivist theory but, instead, rests upon a jurisprudence informed by the pragmatism of William 
James). 
 135. Phil Frickey and I suggested that Hart and Sacks owed much to the philosophical 
pragmatism of John Dewey, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at lxv, and Charles Barzun 
now adds that the pragmatism of William James probably influenced their thought. See Barzun, 
supra note 134, at 16–18. 
 136. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at xi. 
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influenced by Professor Lon Fuller, the leading normativist of their time, and 
engaged Professor H.L.A. Hart, the leading positivist, in a seminar on 
interpretive discretion when he visited at the Harvard Law School in 1956–
57.137 The next year, Hart and Sacks promulgated what was to be the last 
“tentative edition” of their legal process teaching materials. Those materials set 
forth an approach to statutory interpretation that has proven to be highly 
influential and, as I shall argue, jurisprudentially interesting and important. At 
the very least, purposive interpretation, along the lines laid out by Hart and 
Sacks, requires our attention because it is the most popular approach to 
statutory interpretation followed by judicial officials across the industrialized 
world.138 
In developing the outlines of a meta-theory, Professors Hart and Sacks 
started with the basic conditions of human existence, which entail cooperation 
in order to satisfy basic needs, not to mention advancing society and meeting 
its more ambitious goals.139 Thus, people form institutions (families, 
partnerships, etc.), including the state, which is arguably the “overriding, 
general purpose group” with the greatest power and the greatest responsibility 
for “establishing, maintaining, and perfecting the conditions necessary for 
community life to perform its role in the complete development of man.”140 
The state exists “to avoid the disintegration of social order and the consequent 
destruction of the existing benefits of group living” and “to maximize the total 
satisfactions of valid human wants . . . by making a steadily more effective use 
of the resources of group living.”141 Consistent with this view of the state, Hart 
and Sacks offered the following theory of law: “Law is a doing of something, a 
purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social 
living.”142 Accordingly, “[i]t can be accepted as a fixed premise, therefore, that 
every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by the decisional 
process has some kind of purpose or objective[.]”143 
Professors Hart and Sacks thus announced a meta-theory that openly 
toggles between facts and norms, instrumental analysis, and broader 
evaluation. What is law for? Law “follows from the fact that interdependent 
 
 137. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at c–ci. 
 138. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 85–86, 340–41 (2005) 
(purposive interpretation dominates common law and civil law jurisdictions); see id. at 227–28 
(acknowledging Hart and Sacks as the pioneer thinkers in advancing a purposive approach to 
legal interpretation). 
 139. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1–4. 
 140. Id. at 2, 102. 
 141. Id. at 104. 
 142. Id. at 148. 
 143. Id. “The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and 
inadmissible.” Id. at 1124. 
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living is collaborative, cooperative living.”144 How does law contribute to 
interdependent living? The most obvious contribution of law is to enable social 
projects that solve collective action problems and create economic and social 
structures (such as the market and the family) that help people contribute to the 
common interest and live flourishing lives. As Professor Scott Shapiro puts it, 
“the fundamental rules of legal systems are plans. Their function is to structure 
legal activity so that participants can work together and thereby achieve goods 
and realize values that would otherwise be unattainable.”145 Shapiro’s account 
is a thoroughly positivist understanding of a purpose-based meta-theory. If a 
plan is to settle the moral and policy disagreements that precede it, the plan 
itself should be applied purely by reference to social facts, namely, the 
statutory purpose.146 Once a plan has been adopted, it becomes a social fact 
that binds us and authorizes judges to apply it through the lens of its purpose, 
another social fact.147 
Unlike Shapiro, however, Hart and Sacks also embrace normative 
evaluation in their understanding of what law is for. The linchpin for their 
understanding of law is not just solution of collective action problems, but also 
something more. “The social problem [confronted by government and law] has 
been broadly described as that of ‘establishing, maintaining, and perfecting the 
conditions necessary [. . .] for community life to perform its role in the 
complete development of man.’”148 Government and the system of law have as 
their overarching goals (1) the protection of its citizens and the preservation of 
order, (2) the positive goal of “maximiz[ing] the total satisfactions of valid 
human wants,” and (3) “the pragmatic necessity of a currently fair division” of 
the fruits of society among its members.149 Hart and Sacks have a meta-theory 
regarding the point of government—and it is a pragmatic, multifaceted meta-
 
 144. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 3. 
 145. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 28, at 119. Indeed, from Shapiro’s positivist point of 
view, introduction of normativity would undermine the point of law, which is to be “agile, 
durable, and capable of reducing planning costs to such a degree that social problems can be 
solved in an efficient manner.” Id. at 172. “The circumstances of legality obtain whenever a 
community has numerous and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious 
or arbitrary.” Id. at 170. Law is a mechanism, often a coordinating mechanism, by which planning 
can be facilitated, structured, or carried out in an efficient and productive manner. Id. at 172; see 
also Waldron, supra note 116, at 893. 
 146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. But see Waldron, supra note 116, at 893–96 
(suggesting circumstances under which moral criteria would be necessary to fill in the gaps of 
law’s plan). 
 147. BARAK, supra note 138, at 172 (suggesting that many fundamental rights developed out 
of judicial application of the generalized and ultimately accepted presumptions about objective 
texts). 
 148. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 102 (quoting Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of 
Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 47, 52 (1955)). 
 149. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 104 (emphasis in original). 
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theory that requires the state to evaluate as well as facilitate people’s lives, 
organizations, and institutions of cooperation. 
Following Fuller’s lead, The Legal Process emphasized the way in which 
institutions and process can enhance the legitimacy of statutes and the purposes 
they embody. In their discussion of procedural and institutional structure, Hart 
and Sacks explicitly toggled between the “is” and the “ought.”150 Thus, Hart 
and Sacks recognized the independent moral significance of the processes of 
law, but they also treated statutory purposes as constantly in a state or 
reevaluation, not just in light of their efficacy but also in light of their 
relationship to the larger moral goals of society,151 as well as the law’s general 
principles and policies.152 Note Hart and Sacks’s anticipation, here and 
elsewhere, of key ideas later developed by Dworkin’s theory of law as 
integrity.153 
At the end of their lengthy materials on the making and application of law, 
Professors Hart and Sacks presented their theory of statutory interpretation that 
is derived from their meta-theory: 
In interpreting a statute a court should: 
1. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any 
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then 
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out 
the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the 
words either— 
(a) a meaning they will not bear, or 
(b) a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear 
statement. 154 
Among the policies of clear statement Hart and Sacks had in mind were the 
rule of lenity in criminal cases and their own rule that a court should not 
“understand a legislature as directing a departure from a generally prevailing 
principle or policy of the law unless it does so clearly.”155 Encapsulated in the 
 
 150. Id. at 4–6, 108–10. 
 151. After defending their principle of institutional settlement, which takes ethical inquiry out 
of the process of rule-following, id. at 109–10, the authors pose a different relationship between 
law and morality when there is a proper proceeding for altering a previous settlement or for 
settling an unsettled issue: “Is it not plain that here an ethics of a different order has an 
indispensable role to play in assisting the decisionmaker in the evaluation of purposes and of the 
possible means of advancing them?” Id. at 110. 
 152. Id. at 148–49. 
 153. The striking parallels between Hart and Sacks and Dworkin have been thoroughly 
documented by Vincent A. Wellman. Wellman, supra note 134. 
 154. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374. For earlier statements to similar effect, see id. at 
166–67, 1179–1203. 
 155. Id. at 1377. 
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programmatic essay that ended the materials in the 1958 “tentative edition,” 
Hart and Sacks’s summum on statutory interpretation looks like positivist 
prescription for judges because its formula seems to be a straightforward 
conventional inquiry into typically ascertainable facts. Reading this formula in 
light of the authors’ meta-theory and, even more, in light of the problems and 
exercises that form the backbone of their materials, however, reveals that their 
purposive method involved plenty of evaluation. 
How should the court figure out what purpose(s) to attribute to the statute? 
Hart and Sacks counseled judges to follow enacted statements of purpose156 
and, more generally, to put themselves in the place of the legislature enacting 
the measure, “assum[ing], unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the 
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”157 Reasonableness, it may be assumed, is understood by reference 
to the social purposes served by government, namely, protection, human 
flourishing, and fairness.158 If statutory meaning is not clear after considering 
these standard sources, Hart and Sacks urged that the interpreter consider “an 
appropriate presumption drawn from some general policy of the law.”159 
Policies and principles of the law are “useful as guides to the exercise of a 
trained and responsible discretion.”160 And when the underlying statutory 
purpose or policy is ambiguous, “the official should interpret it in the way 
which best harmonizes with more basic principles and policies of the law.”161 
Consistent with their engagement with the legisprudences of both Lon 
Fuller and H.L.A. Hart, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks sought to create a theory 
of statutory interpretation that was conventional, but with room for normative 
evolution, responsiveness, and creativity. Like Shapiro’s planning theory, Hart 
and Sacks emphasized problem-solving; once the legislature has itself engaged 
in normative deliberation, its purposes as well as the statutory text it has 
produced are both social facts that can be applied through conventional 
reasoning. Unlike Shapiro’s planning theory, however, Hart and Sacks 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1378. In ascertaining purpose, Hart and Sacks urged judges to consider not just the 
legislative history of the law, but also the administrative and popular understanding of what the 
law means. Id. at 1379; see also id. at 1253–54 (urging judges to be aggressive when 
interrogating legislative history to discern what it might teach them about a statute, especially its 
purpose). 
 158. Id. at 104. 
 159. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1380. 
 160. Id. at 143. 
 161. Id. at 147. The basic principles and policies of the law form the basis for extending a rule 
or statute to a novel context, id. at 362–83; for reformulating old rules or provisions, id. at 383–
403; and for replacing old rules or practices with more up-to-date ones, id. at 545–76; see also 
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 87–89 (1982) (drawing from 
Hart and Sacks the notion that courts ought to be able to overrule obsolescent statutes). 
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required that judges “attribute” (not “discover”) statutory purpose and then 
“evaluate” (not “apply”) that purpose in light of broad social goals, as well as 
legal principles and policies.162 Not only did Hart and Sacks explicitly 
contemplate toggling between social facts (the legislative purpose) and norms 
(the attributed purpose), but they also seemed comfortable with the possibility 
that our society is both a rulebook community and a community of principle. 
Thus, they say that courts serve a useful function in our polity in part because 
they settle uncertainties in the law, but also because they are “agencies of 
correction of law which is unclear or unjust.”163 
Professor Anthony Sebok considers Hart and Sacks important to a robust 
positivist theory of law because they filled in an important hole in H.L.A. 
Hart’s theory.164 Recall that H.L.A. Hart believed that the law “ran out” in the 
hard cases and that judges had discretion in those cases to make law.165 Hart 
and Sacks’s theory of adjudication fills in this discretionary space with their 
distinctive contribution to legal analysis, namely, the role of general policies 
and principles. Thus, the judge in the hard cases is guided by general policies 
and principles when she decides how to exercise that lawmaking discretion. 
Sebok considers this entirely positivist.166 Although Sebok is correct to say that 
The Legal Process provides a useful supplement to H.L.A. Hart’s theory of 
discretionary decision-making, that is not the only point that can be made 
about the materials.167 Again anticipating Dworkin, Hart and Sacks understood 
adjudication to be a process of “reasoned elaboration” that demanded judicial 
creativity in applying existing legal authorities to concrete cases and new 
problems in light of the larger goals of society as well as overarching legal 
policies and principles.168 
 
 162. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374 (“attribute”), 110 (“evaluation”). 
 163. Id. at 343. 
 164. SEBOK, supra note 88, at 129–38. 
 165. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text; see also HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra 
note 1, at 132. 
 166. Unlike Shapiro, who is an exclusive legal positivist, Sebok is an inclusive legal 
positivist, who maintains that the law can incorporate normative precepts. Hart and Sacks’s 
notion of general policies and principles that guide discretion is, from Sebok’s point of view, a 
splendid example of inclusive legal positivism. See SEBOK, supra note 88. 
 167. Barzun, supra note 134, at 5; Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394–97 (1996) 
(noting that the legal process theory envisions “a blend of positive and normative functions [for 
judges], thus rescuing judicial action from the moral aridity of positivism”); Vincent A. Wellman, 
Positivism, Emergent and Triumphant, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1722, 1737–45 (1999) (reviewing 
SEBOK, supra note 88) [hereinafter Wellman, Positivism]. 
 168. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 145–52; see Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The 
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 633, 640 (1993); 
Wellman, Positivism, supra note 167, at 1738–39. 
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The jurisprudential toggling that I have been exploring is a useful way to 
understand the relationship of legal process theory to positivism and 
normativism. Unlike Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, Professors 
Hart and Sacks were not analytic philosophers. They were practical lawyers, 
and Hart (the senior partner in the enterprise) had been a significant official 
administering the wartime economy during World War II.169 In my view, the 
legal process materials were less interested in the positivism-natural law 
debate, and were more interested in laying out a theory of law that provided 
overall predictability but flexibility in response to the fast-changing world they 
saw unfolding (and that Hart knew well from his service in the government). 
Professor Fuller, their close collaborator, spoke for the legal process school 
when he observed that “in the moving world of law, the is and the ought are 
inseparably mixed.”170 
If legal process theory is a jurisprudence of toggling, as I am claiming, 
consider how it would apply to the Case of the Spotted Owl. Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the Court made a classic legal process argument to support a broad 
reading of “take.”171 Section 2(a) states that a central purpose of the 
endangered species law is preserving the habitat of endangered species, a point 
amply confirmed by the law’s legislative history.172 To the extent that § 9(a)’s 
anti-take rule is ambiguous as to whether it bars farmers and ranchers from 
harming endangered animals by destroying habitat, such ambiguity should be 
resolved consistent with the statutory purpose.173 
This syllogism resolves the case for the majority Justices, but this would 
not have been the end point for Hart and Sacks, as they demanded that the 
judge critically interrogate the invocation of purpose.174 And that is exactly 
what the dissenting Justices did. Accepting the statutory purpose to protect 
 
 169. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2036 (1994) (Professor Hart took a leave of absence from Harvard in 1942 
to serve as Associate General Counsel of the Office of Price Administration). 
 170. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 64 (1940); accord HART & SACKS, supra 
note 2, at 108–10. The account in text is taken from Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at liv–
lxviii (providing a thick account of the intellectual background of the materials and making this 
point by reference to Fuller’s response to the legal realists). 
 171. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995). 
 172. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (Endangered Species Act purpose clause); Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 
704–08. 
 173. In detail, here is the argument: section 9(a) says that private persons may not “take” an 
endangered species. Section 3(19) says that “take” includes “harm.” It is plausible to say that 
destroying an endangered species’ habitat in a way that “actually harms” the species (the precise 
rule adopted by the agency in 1975 and 1981) “harms,” and therefore “takes,” the species. If there 
is any ambiguity, it ought to be resolved in favor of an interpretation that carries out the § 2(a) 
purpose of protecting habitat and, by that, helping prevent endangered species from becoming 
extinct. 
 174. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1377–80. 
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endangered species against harms, Justice Scalia observed that the most 
obvious way landowners can “harm” endangered species is by a “specially 
focused hurt or injury” to particular animals.175 Both the statutory structure and 
the representations of the sponsors demonstrated that these discrete problems 
faced by endangered species were meant to be addressed by different statutory 
provisions. Thus, §§ 5 and 7(a) were the provisions aimed at the habitat 
conservation goal, while § 9(a) was aimed at the anti-predation goal.176 This is 
an excellent point regarding the 1973 Act—though Justice Stevens effectively 
responded that the 1982 Amendments expanded the habitat conservation goal 
to include private landowner development projects and routine economic 
uses.177 
This is still not the end of a legal process analysis. Consider the pragmatics 
that are opened up by the legal process approach, as reflected in the 
legisprudence of Justice Stephen Breyer. Following Hart and Sacks, Breyer 
maintains that statutory interpretation is a purposive enterprise, but he deepens 
legal process legisprudence with his highly practical approach to statutory 
purpose. Thus, Breyer asks the standard Hart and Sacks questions, such as 
what are the statutory purposes, and which interpretation best carries forth the 
statutory purpose?178 But he also wants to know, what is the actual effect of 
adopting this rule as opposed to that rule, or that standard? How will each rule 
or standard work? Where an agency has implemented a statutory scheme 
through regulation, Breyer is interested in knowing what effect his ruling will 
have on the agency’s ability to enforce the statute effectively.179 These lines of 
inquiry are entirely consistent with the pragmatic philosophy underlying and 
the method deployed in the Hart and Sacks materials.180 
Although Breyer joined Stevens’s opinion for the Court in the Case of the 
Spotted Owl, his pragmatics of purposivism does suggest a concern with the 
 
 175. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 724–29. 
 177. Id. at 700–01 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); see also id. at 703 n.17 (Congress also 
relied on the Department’s understanding when it amended the law in 1978). But see Victoria F. 
Nourse, Decision Theory and Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Skepticism about Norms, Discretion, and 
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Court’s interpretation. Confronted with the Department’s “harm” regulation, 
Chuck Cushman, Executive Director of the American Land Rights 
Association, insisted upon the Blackstonian rights of ranchers and farmers. 
Defiantly, he publicly urged this response: when landowners find an 
endangered animal on their property the best solution under current law is to 
“shoot, shovel and shut up.”181 According to Cushman, “[a] private-property 
owner is thinking to himself, ‘I find a spotted owl on my property, I’m going to 
lose everything I’ve worked for all my life.’”182 Perhaps a more common 
response than this abrasive one was that of Betty Orem, one of the property 
owners who were plaintiffs in the Sweet Home litigation. Quietly and during 
the course of the litigation, without the knowledge of the regulators, Orem 
went ahead and cut the trees on her land, destroying habitat needed by the 
spotted owl.183 
The Justices (perhaps including Breyer) were probably not aware of these 
ramifications of the sweeping rule they were upholding, and that is one of the 
pitfalls of the Hart and Sacks purpose approach. The instrumental and 
evaluative analysis required by their theory asks the interpreter to figure out 
which interpretation will best carry out and even deepen the statutory 
purpose—and often that cannot be determined without a greater understanding 
of markets, sociology, behavior, cognitive biases, and economics than judges 
(including Hercules) possess. 
Although not given great prominence in their materials, Professors Hart 
and Sacks did think about this problem and had a suggestion: courts should 
follow the policy leads of agencies that have been charged with implementing 
statutory schemes.184 On the current Court, Justice Breyer has carried forth this 
legal process idea most enthusiastically to support judicial deference to agency 
interpretations.185 While most of the Justices emphasize the greater legitimacy 
agencies enjoy when filling in statutory gaps, Justice Breyer gives some 
emphasis to the agency’s greater competence to figure out the delicate balance 
of purposes and goals the statute carries with it, and to figure out, both 
instrumentally and normatively, how to implement those statutory goals in the 
 
 181. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the 
Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826–27 (1997) (quoting Cushman, who 
called civil disobedience a rational response to Sweet Home’s outcome). 
 182. Id. at 827. 
 183. Id. at 853–54. 
 184. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1380. 
 185. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 43, at 1154 (reporting that Justice Breyer is the most 
agency-deferential of the Justices currently in practice, going along with agency views in almost 
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right way.186 If Breyer rather than Stevens had written for the majority in Sweet 
Home, he would have focused much more on the competence of the agency to 
do the cost-benefit calculus and the balance of normative considerations 
entailed by the “harm” regulation. Indeed, he might have advised the 
Department of Interior to proceed with the “harm” rule cautiously, in light of 
the balance of purposes reflected in the 1982 Amendments. 
And that is precisely what Secretary Babbitt did. In the wake of his 
smashing victory, Secretary Babbitt, an environmentalist but also a pragmatist, 
pledged to make the Endangered Species Act less onerous for private 
landowners. In June 1995, a month after Sweet Home, the Department 
proposed to exempt nearly all small and residential landholders (such as Betty 
Orem) from its § 9 requirements for protecting the habitat of threatened plants 
and animals.187 Within three years of Sweet Home, the Department issued a 
final rule assuring landowners who negotiated “habitat conservation plans” that 
the allowances in those plans were permanent and would not be adjusted even 
if new circumstances would have justified more duties.188 Since Sweet Home, 
the habitat-protective features of endangered species law have been primarily 
enforced through contracts and agreements between the government and 
private parties, establishing consent-based regimes for property management 
that create promising channels for engaging property owners in the species-
preserving agenda of the Act.189 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, legal process theory deepens and 
expands the case for a primary focus on agency interpretation and 
implementation in the modern regulatory state. Agencies chock full of 
expertise and more accountable to the political process and democratically 
elected officials are the primary interpreters in our republic of statutes, and the 
complicated purposive analysis required by legal process legisprudence can 
better be carried out by agencies than by judges.190 Thus, the central feature of 
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the Case of the Spotted Owl is not, by this account, the range of meanings that 
might be attributed to the words “take” and “harm,” nor the political theory 
that best justifies or negates the “harm” regulation, but instead the amount of 
trust our legal system should be lodging in the Department of Interior to carry 
out the requirements of the Endangered Species Act in a practical and 
purposive way.191 
This “economy of trust,” in turn, creates the same kind of problem for legal 
process theory that I imagined for H.L.A. Hart’s theory of legal positivism, 
namely, the requirement of normative judgment. As Justice Scalia’s Sweet 
Home dissent suggests, whether we trust the Department of Justice to work out 
the application of the “harm” regulation in a satisfactory manner is not just 
informed by social facts (has Babbitt actually saved some endangered species 
by conserving habitat?), but also by judgments of political morality. Echoing 
the “simplest farmer,” Justice Scalia does not trust the Department. His crack 
about the poor farmer’s “conscription to national zoological service” is not a 
statement of social fact; it is an assertion of moral philosophy and, implicitly, a 
reminder of the property-respecting traditions that Scalia and his expected 
audience believe are still central to America’s great story. 
Conversely, Justices Stevens and Breyer trust the agency. Justice Breyer’s 
new book, Making Our Democracy Work (2010), situates the Supreme Court 
within the larger frame of American history and claims that the Court 
succeeds, modestly, when it contributes to mutual cooperation (and trust) 
among the various institutions of government.192 Implicitly, his account 
suggests that the Court does not succeed when its trust is misguided or its own 
decisions contribute to mistrust within the system. Justice Aharon Barak, the 
former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, presses legal process theory 
even more in the direction of normative engagement. In his book on Purposive 
Interpretation in Law (2005), Justice Barak maintains that statutory 
interpretation is a meta-interpretation of a society’s democratic and other 
normative commitments.193 Reminiscent of Dworkin as well as Hart and 
Sacks, Barak says that proper interpretation must not only be workable,194 but 
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“must be able to give the text the meaning that best achieves the goal of 
interpretation in law,” which is to “guarantee orderly social life.”195 
CONCLUSION: TOGGLE AND CONSEQUENCES 
As illustrated by the Case of the Spotted Owl, the jurisprudence of toggling 
rests upon a meta-theory of law as both instrumental and constitutive. 
Consistent especially with legal process theory, a jurisprudence of toggling 
understands that legal officials engage in a hermeneutical enterprise that entails 
retrieving past decisions, evaluating them in light of current circumstances and 
the facts of the case, and figuring out the best way to go forward within the 
confines of legal conventions.196 If I am right, or close to right, about the 
jurisprudence of toggling, there are important consequences for jurisprudence, 
statutory interpretation, and court-agency relations. 
Jurisprudentially, the fact-norm toggling phenomenon presents significant 
problems for positivist jurisprudence and for the leading normativist theory, 
law as integrity. Scholars of jurisprudence might consider moving beyond the 
now-outdated Hart-Fuller and Hart-Dworkin debates between positivists and 
normativists and delving more deeply into the jurisprudence underlying (or 
justifying) the legal process approach. As Professors Philip Frickey and Daniel 
Farber have long argued, American pragmatism (James, Pierce, and Dewey, 
for example) offers a rich philosophical tradition from which to draw.197 
In terms of statutory interpretation theory, the jurisprudence of toggling 
suggests that legal doctrine is not as decisive as leading theorists maintain. 
This is Nino’s Nightmare. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s splendid dissenting opinion 
in Sweet Home is the exemplar for the mobility of doctrine as well as the 
jurisprudence of toggling. That even the doctrinally dogmatic Justice Scalia is 
a toggler is quite striking. He presents himself as a Hartian positivist as he 
argues that the Sweet Home majority Justices decide the case contrary to 
established conventions, yet his opinion also reveals a thoughtful Dworkinian 
process of normative meta-judgment and Hart and Sacksian purposivism. 
Making his nightmare worse, the toggling phenomenon also haunts Justice 
Scalia’s new book with linguist Bryan Garner, which argues that the rule of 
law would be strengthened if judges would follow fifty-seven simple canons of 
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statutory construction (and avoid thirteen anti-canons denounced in the 
book).198 As the Case of the Spotted Owl suggests, a jurisprudence of canons is 
in no meaningful way constraining, and its effort to deny the normativity of 
statutory interpretation is seriously misleading. 
Finally, the jurisprudence of toggling helps us understand the roles of 
agencies and courts in statutory interpretation. All of the leading 
jurisprudential theories take judges as their exemplary agents of law and 
interpretation. That is astounding, as agencies have long (i.e., for several 
generations) been the primary institutions for interpreting as well as 
implementing statutes. The new legal process school recognizes this fact and 
makes it central to a modern approach to the law that is saturated by toggles 
between facts and norms, instrumental and normative analyses.199 
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